Egyptian Women: An Optimist’s Account
On the eve of the revolution, Israa, a young female blogger, wrote on Facebook,“instead of advising me not to demonstrate on the 25th of January, join me and that will be the real protections for everyone.” Israa was one of hundreds of young women who joined their male colleagues in using the Internet as a tool for activism; a phenomenon that was expanding quickly amongst the young Arab men and women, bringing a new constituency to activism with their own innovative and very effective tools.
During the few years that preceded the revolution many young women were already involved in cyber activism, women who were mostly outside the feminist NGOs circles and were active when it comes to issues of mainstream human rights issues. Tahrir Square(s) resembled a promised heaven for women, the utopian community that came with the revolution welcoming and admiring their participation, encouraging women to transgress traditional barriers and negotiate their presence in the streets. Many women dared to face up to their families’ resistance and the small battles at home to bring down patriarchal hegemony over them as sisters daughters and wives side by side with the big battle to bring down Mubarak’s authoritarian regime and its police hegemony.
But, the first few months after Mubarak stepped down weren’t really promising for women. The first “revolutionary” prime minster who took his oath in Tahrir square avoided meeting with the feminist NGO coalition, and ignored all their recommendations in regards to female ministers, or the reform of the national women’s machinery (the National Council for Women). The newly established political parties hushed into hasty parliamentary elections, were keen on securing some seats and resisted including women on their elections lists. The first women’s demonstration on March 8, 2011, was fiercely attacked by the conservative Islamist groups. Moreover, new violations of women’s rights came through virginity tests and stripping women in the streets by the Supreme Council for the Armed Forces (SCAF) and the police troops. It was as if the age-old scenario is being repeated again, “the revolution is finished… Go back home.”
In the discussion on the “supra constitutional principles” and criteria for choosing members of the constituent Assembly, women were excluded by almost all political factions and not only the Islamists. Only a few groups, mainly human rights groups, were keen on raising issues of gender equality, none, however, discrimination and full citizenship. Contrary to Tunisia, No one called for parity except feminists.
Then came the Constitution
The recent Egyptian constitutional document signed by President Mohamed Morsi on December 26, 2012 crystallizes the current Egyptian situation, marking an end of one phase of the revolution, with an obvious statement: Political Islam is a continuation of the previous regime, authoritarian, hegemonic and capitalist, but more dangerous because it raises the banner of religion in the face of its opponents. This is not just about the controversial articles it espouses, but also about the process it went through.
Since the very beginning, in establishing a committee for constitutional amendments, women were excluded, despite the fact that the constitutional court president’s deputy was a woman. The collaboration between the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) and the Muslim Brothers (MB) resulted in bringing a strong representation of political Islam in the constituency of the committee.
However, women’s NGOs adopted the strategy of imposing; invited or not they persistently made every effort to be present at all forums and provided their input. Early in 2011, the feminist NGOs coalition provided their own initiative (one of 10 initiatives from the different political groups) on the “supra constitutional principles” and the criteria for choosing the members of the Constituent Assembly. These points emphasized equality and no discrimination on any grounds including gender, prohibiting torture and inhumane treatments in both public and private domains, temporary and affirmative measures to ensure women’s representation, and the supremacy of International human rights conventions over national laws. In regards to membership of the Constituent Assembly, they called for parity between men and women in all categories (workers, farmers, civil society, legal experts, etc.).
Working on the junction between gender, class age and religion and, and framing their rights within the general context of democratic change feminists managed to gain support from many political and social groups, e.g. addressing the issue of violence against women within the wider context of inhuman and degrading treatment and torture.
From equality to traditional roles
The preamble of the Constitution laying out the main principles states that, “there shall be no dignity for a country where women are not honored; women are the sisters of men and partners in national gains and responsibilities” (Principle Three). Then again, Principle Five states that there is, “Equality and equal opportunities for all female and male citizens…. in rights and responsibilities.” Yet, this language disappears totally in all articles of the Constitution where the masculine prevails.
In earlier drafts, Article 36 stated that, “The state is committed to take all legislative and executive measures to entrench the principle of equality between women and men in political, cultural, economic, social and all other fields, without prejudice to Islamic Sharia. The state will provide free maternity services and conciliation in regards to woman’s duties towards family and public work.” The article was strongly criticized by many groups including some members of the Constituent Assembly itself. It was replaced in the final draft by Article 10, which dropped the “equality” issue, and emphasized even more the traditional roles, portraying women as only part of families even if they are dislocated by death or divorce: “The state will provide free maternity services and conciliation between a woman’s duties towards her family and her public work. The state provides special care and protection for women who are breadwinners, divorced or widowed.”
Although Article Two is still the same as it was in 1971 Constitution – “Islam is the religion of the state and Arabic is its official language. Principles of Islamic Sharia are the principal source of legislation” – it now represents a real threat when joined with Article 219 that states,“The principles of Islamic Sharia include general evidence, foundational and jurisprudence rules, and its acknowledged sources accepted in Sunni doctrines and by the larger community.” It thus opens the door for judges to use conservative interpretations, which explains the quest perused lately against the judicial Egyptian system by the Muslim Brothers.
Articles 11 completes the picture, with their vague rhetorical language on safeguarding “morality,” “Arab culture,” “religious and patriotic values,” all subject to variant interpretations, particularly when the legislator holds – him or herself - a conservative attitude towards women’s rights.
Another aspect is also relevant to women’s rights, Article 145 on international treaties and conventions.3 Contrary to the 1971 Constitution, both chambers have to approve international conventions. The last sentence of Article 145 states: “No treaty contrary to the provisions of the Constitution shall be approved.” This might be an outlet to withdraw the ratification of the Convention on Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). The fierce campaign against CEDAW, then against the Commission on the Status of Women’s (CSW) document on violence against women supports such thinking.
Reasons for optimism?
The picture looks gloomy, particularly to outsiders. But, it is not. For sure, wide circles of Egyptians have lost the battle of “the Constitution.” For sure also, wider sectors of Egyptians, including women, feel exhausted by the deteriorating situation particularly on the security and economic fronts. But it will be a mistake to miss the impact of what happened over the past 26 months.
Egyptians in general resumed their political appetite and sense of ownership of their own country and resuming their dignified full citizenship. As for women, particularly younger generations, the revolutionary context encouraged them also to decide to live their lives fully fledged, to practice their citizenship, and to be political animals just as their male fellow citizens. Thousands of women of all ages joined the newly established political parties. Even those who had never been active and never shown symptoms of political dynamism were inspired by the revolution and joined parties’ women’s committees.
The main aspect is that for the first time in Egypt, women’s issues are clearly put on the political agenda. All parties had to have “something” on women’s rights on their programs, as it became, together with the freedom of belief and minority rights, a point of departure between those who support a civil state and those who call for a religious state. Candidates for the Presidency advocating the “Civil State” sought to meet with women’s groups, and to include women’s rights in their election programs.
Most important however, the revolution helped feminists and women’s groups to reach out and engage with wider sectors of women all over the country through the lections campaigns and lobbying for the constitution. The violations of women’s rights by SCAF and Islamists failed their objective to spread fear among women; on the contrary, it gained them the support of widening sectors of the community even when it comes to such taboo issues as sexual harassment and gang rape. Comparing the 8th of March demonstrations in 2011 and 2013 is evidence that can’t be ignored.
One battle that Egyptian feminist need not go through, is the battle with “state feminism,” which had always co-opted feminist language and its agenda only to dilute them, abort possibilities for genuine change and keep things within the state’s limited course. Surely, “Islamic state feminism” has a much more limited chance to win women’s support with figures like Pakinam el-Sharkawi (assistant to the president) or Azza al-Garf (ex-parliament member) who openly antagonize women’s rights or deny their violations.
The time is ripe for building the feminist movement – not an easy task, but it is possible despite the Islamists’ Constitution.